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FOREWORD
The Nordic states, just as other regions of Europe
which neighbor Russia, are engaged in an urgent reexamination of their security and defense posture.
Events in Ukraine in early-2014 threw into sharp
focus a local lack of capability following decades of
drawdowns and focus on crisis management operations instead of territorial defense. After an unpleasant awakening, countries in the region have turned
their attention to the heightened security risks they
face and their lack of preparedness for them.
In an era of continuing austerity, the challenge
for these states is how to design a working security
and defense solution in the short and medium term
which is both robust enough to survive in isolation,
but also capable of being merged into a bigger framework such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) when the time is ripe. This would serve not
just local, but also U.S. interests in safeguarding local
allies and partners while limiting the need for permanent presence in the region. Deeper defense cooperation between the Nordic countries is an essential part
of this solution.
This monograph, by two highly experienced Finnish defense researchers with unparalleled expertise in
assessing the problems posed by Russia as a neighbor,
evaluates the options open to the Nordic region. It
reviews both the opportunities available for regional
cooperation (as well as ones from the past which have
been missed), and the scope for enhanced engagement
with the United States both within the framework of
NATO and beyond.
As such, it provides a valuable assessment from a
local perspective of how regional security challenges
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can best be addressed, and an important review of
opportunities for the United States to increase the
effectiveness of defense cooperation with Northern
Europe. It makes an important contribution to our understanding of the possibilities and constraints of Nordic defense, and is highly recommended to planners
and policymakers working on European and NATO
problem sets.
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Events in Ukraine in early-2014 have prompted a
re-evaluation of national defense capabilities across
Europe. In the case of the Nordic states (Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland), this renewed
attention has highlighted the lack of military resources
to fulfill nationally stated defense tasks. Two decades
of underinvestment in defense, force reductions, and
focus on expeditionary crisis management in support
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
have combined to hollow out the once fundamental
principles of territorial defense. Northern Europe has
been left dangerously exposed to military coercion in
a time of greatly increased uncertainty.
As NATO member states, Norway and Denmark
are better off than nonaligned Finland and Sweden,
but common to all of them is the perception that security cannot be managed alone but has to be developed in cooperation with each other. During 2014,
profoundly negative developments in Ukraine, mixed
and disappointing signals from the NATO Summit in
Wales, and the question marks left by the result of the
Swedish parliamentary elections all combined to reinforce the stalemate in domestic politics over Swedish or Finnish membership in NATO. In this context,
there is little that the United States can do to “help
solve the problem,” since it is, in fact, self-inflicted in
both countries. Attempts to influence public opinion
in Finland or Sweden directly would, however wellintended, be counterproductive.
The Nordic countries, apart from their different
security political solutions to date, have one thing in
common. They all depend on the United States for their
critical national defense. Strengthening these bilateral
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ties, as well as building on them within the framework
of the Nordic Security Dialogue launched at the meeting
between President Barack Obama and Nordic heads
of state in Stockholm, Sweden, in September 2013,
hold the potential to be fundamental building blocks
for a new security assurance in the region. Conversely, meeting the Nordic and Baltic security challenges
without the support of the United States is doomed to
failure, and the entire region would be left vulnerable
and exposed to extortion and external threat.
There is significant scope for defense cooperation
with and between the Nordic states, which have been
notably less resistant to defense burden sharing than
several established NATO allies in Western Europe.
In particular, enhanced cooperation with the United
States by Finland and Sweden, backed up by U.S. security guarantees in whatever form they may take,
has the potential to lessen the current isolation and
exposure of the Baltic States to intimidation by Russia.
Based on both historical and current analysis of the
problem, the authors propose that cooperation among
the Nordic states (to the point of complete interoperability) and with the United States is essential.
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BREAKING THE NORDIC DEFENSE DEADLOCK
INTRODUCTION
Events in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine in early-2014
provided a sudden demonstration of Europe’s vulnerability to new Russian capabilities and old Russian intentions. This prompted a re-examination of security
policy throughout Russia’s western neighbors. In the
case of the Nordic states (Finland, Sweden, Norway,
Denmark, and Iceland), it highlighted the extent to
which over 2 decades of spending cuts and increased
focus on crisis management instead of territorial defense had hollowed out defense capabilities, leaving
both North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
and non-NATO countries in the region dangerously
exposed. In recent years, this has applied even to
Finland, which previously had maintained a more
conservative defense posture by comparison with its
western neighbors.
But even if there were the political will and economic potential to re-invest in credible defensive
deterrence, this would be a long process. In the
meantime, in a time of increasing tension, as well as
declining military strength and capabilities among
friends and allies, the need is evident for states in the
region to cooperate constructively with each other for
mutual support, and with allies beyond the region too.
All Nordic countries need each other and the United
States for their security. Meanwhile, the United States
needs friends and allies in the area if it wishes to
secure peace, stability, and its own interests in the
Nordic, Baltic, and especially Arctic regions.
As the deterrent and war-preventing value of
the Nordic defense forces is increasingly challenged,
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building common capabilities should no longer be on
hold, but should be pursued vigorously despite national political obstacles. Bearing in mind the need
to synchronize Nordic defense, waiting for all Nordic countries to join NATO is not an option. Unless
some extremely dramatic turn for the worse happens
in the Nordic neighborhood, the wait will probably
be too long. In the meantime, the national defense
capabilities of Finland and Sweden are likely to
deteriorate further.
This monograph therefore explores the scope, potential, and benefits of closer defense cooperation between the Nordic states themselves and with the United States. The current state of cooperation is reviewed,
together with the regional and national factors that
hold it back; and the value of specific joint initiatives
is considered. Particular strengths and weaknesses of
each of the region’s militaries are highlighted, to give
context to proposed defense synergies. This leads to a
particularly close examination of the case of Finland,
as the state with both the greatest exposure to Russia
as a result of its long land border and (not coincidentally) the greatest emphasis on self-defense in its security policy. Finally, a range of policy recommendations is provided for U.S. decisionmakers considering
the prospects for closer Nordic defense ties, and the
role of the United States in European security overall.
HISTORY AND CONTEXT
The potential for deeper security cooperation both
between the Nordic states and beyond the region with
the United States and NATO naturally depends on
domestic political attitudes in each country. These in
turn are heavily influenced not only by constitutional
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factors and contemporary political concerns, but also
by each country’s historical experience during the
20th century, which led each Nordic state to its own
distinct solution for ensuring its security. This section
therefore briefly considers the formative experiences
of Nordic countries, in order to provide context for
the present state of security cooperation and also to
explain some of its limitations.
For Europe, ghosts from the past came alive in
early-2014, as senior Russian figures praised the early
achievements of fascist Germany, but at the same time
portrayed the democratically elected new president of
Ukraine and his administration as Nazis.1 Traumatic
memories from World War II have been stirred in Poland, the Baltic States, and the Nordic countries, too.
Although acute and grave security concerns are not
yet universal, war, so unthinkable just a while ago,
now has to be taken into account.
The experience of the Nordic countries during
World War II shaped their subsequent defense policies.
The Finnish performance in the Winter War 1939-40 is
well-known, but less so is the closing months in the
summer of 1944 of the “Continuation War” between
the Soviet Union and Finland.2 The strategic assault
of the Red Army was anticipated, but when it started
on the Karelian Isthmus on June 9, the overwhelming
size of the force deployed and its crushing firepower
caught the Finnish High Command by surprise. The
Finnish Army, dispirited at first, was forced to retreat
but gradually recovered. The Russian onslaught, aiming at defeating the Finnish Army rapidly in a couple
of weeks, slowed down and was repulsed altogether
after a month of ferocious fighting. When an armistice
came into force in early September 1944, the front
line was entirely outside the present Finnish-Russian
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border. This was the only one of the Soviet strategic
assault operations that failed, a remarkable defensive
achievement by a small army against a superpower.
Finland’s freedom and independence were saved. Later on, a number of very distinguished Finnish military
officers emigrated to the United States and enlisted
in the U.S. Army, bringing with them extraordinary
expertise on Finnish combat tactics, winter warfare, and offensive and defensive warfare in rugged
forest terrain.3
Sweden was one of the few European countries
that managed to stay out of World War II. In 1939, the
readiness of the Swedish Defense Forces was remarkably low, as the decision taken in 1925 to embark upon
successive disarmament was still felt. War weariness
in the aftermath of the Great War, the perceived weakness of Soviet Russia and Germany, the forming of the
League of Nations and popular hopes for international achievements in the disarmament field all contributed to the perception among liberals in Sweden that
reductions in defense spending were reasonable. The
political left anticipated enduring and stable peace
for several decades to come. If international relations
were to deteriorate in Europe, ample time would be
given to react and rearm, it was assumed. These sentiments in Sweden in the late-1930s unfortunately very
much resemble the situation and thinking of presentday Sweden, which has led to reforms that leave the
country relatively unprepared for territorial defense
until at least the early-2020s.
It was only the swift German invasion of Denmark and Norway in April 1940 that brought a complete change of attitude in Stockholm, as Sweden
was suddenly squarely in the German orbit. Sweden
changed its defense posture and embarked upon an
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ambitious armament program. The goals formulated
in 1940 were not, however, achieved until several
years after the conclusion of World War II. Even 70
years ago, building capability and readiness was
time consuming.
Although formally neutral, Sweden could not
maintain strict neutrality during World War II and
neither was it in her interest. Sweden was nonaligned,
and adapted to the changing war situation. Strong
popular support for Finland resulted in perhaps the
largest ever deployment of a volunteer military force,
about 8,500 men to Northern Finland in early-1940,
including one-third of the Swedish Air Force.
For Germany, occupation of Norway brought logistical problems, and the Nazis immediately put strong
pressure on Sweden for permission to use Swedish
railways for transporting troops and supplies to the
north. Sweden soon gave in, and transit transports of
German soldiers “on leave” as well as military equipment began in July 1940. Finland accepted German
transit traffic on essentially equal terms 2 months
later. The German traffic through Sweden continued
until August 1943. By this time, Germany’s strength
was already fading. Allied powers had for some time
demanded that Sweden cut down cooperation with
Germany and improve relations with them. As the Allied bombing campaign gained strength and airspace
control became increasingly difficult, Allied bombers
returning from Germany on northerly courses occasionally intruded into Swedish airspace. Sweden
had to respond. Anecdotes of radio conversations
between Allied aircrews and Swedish air defenses on
the ground suggest a cooperative attitude despite the
formalities of challenging these overflights.4
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While the Nordic countries all drew different formative experiences from World War II, the different
paths of national defense that they then embarked
upon were further influenced by the new geopolitical situation after 1945, the rise of the Iron Curtain,
and the emerging Cold War, as well as the simple
geographical location of the different countries.
THE NORDIC COLD WAR EXPERIENCE
Finland.
Immediately after the war, an entirely new political epoch started for the Nordic states. Finland, in particular, had to adapt to co-existence with the world’s
indisputable new great power, the Soviet Union,
whose ambitions to extend both its social system and
geopolitical sphere of interest could not be mistaken.
The role of Finland as a front-line state was thus set,
and this is a role that Finland continues to fill today:
the unique circumstances of being “neighbor to a superpower and next door to a military alliance” mean
that the Finnish defense posture is key to the security
of the Nordic region as a whole, and this posture receives close attention in this monograph accordingly.5
As put by one leading politician when considering a
past proposal for a Nordic defense treaty: “Finland
has always been the defender of Sweden. This would
just be making it official.”6
At the outset of the Cold War, Finland was obliged
to make significant concessions curtailing the country’s sovereignty. The most important of these two
was the tough peace treaty of 1947 with former enemies, the Soviet Union and Great Britain; and the
so-called 1948 Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and
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Mutual Assistance (FCMA Treaty) between Finland
and the Soviet Union. Under these agreements, the
peacetime military strength and permitted armament
of the Finnish army were limited so dramatically that
her defense capability rapidly collapsed. The Finnish
government energetically attempted to acquire some
sort of preferential right of interpretation regarding
the true content of the treaty during the next 40 years,
but naturally the Soviet Union and the Western powers drew their own conclusions. Finland’s policy of
neutrality hence became hotly disputed. Most authorities were not sure how to take Finland, and there was
particular uncertainty concerning the question of how
she would act in crisis situations.
Author and journalist Jukka Rislakki has conducted a thorough and convincing study of the relations of
the U.S. and other Western powers to Finland during
the Cold War.7 One of Rislakki’s specific findings is
that the main western actors were surprisingly willing
and ready to support Finland, without definite military undertakings. Possible military support would be
given on an ad hoc basis in a war situation and only if
Finland chose the West rather than the Soviets.
Finnish neutrality during the Cold War, of course,
demanded defense in all directions. In reality, however, intrusions from the West into Finnish territory
apparently would not have been met with more than
token “resistance,” if at all.8 An attack from the West
simply was not considered a very serious option. Real
contingency plans were aimed at fighting potential Soviet ground forces attacks. For security reasons, these
were not put on paper, but rather entrusted to selected key military personnel responsible for maintaining them. In 1974, newly appointed Chief of Defense
General Lauri Sutela offered to present operational
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plans to his Supreme Commander, President Urho
Kekkonen, but the latter respectfully declined, saying:
“I’m not interested in details, but I rely on you and
trust that you know what you have to do.”9 Prudence
apparently dictated his choice: What he didn’t know,
he couldn’t inadvertently reveal in the frequent talks
he had with the Russians.
Finland’s policy of neutrality during the Cold War
sought particular support from the so-called Nordic
balance, a term coined by the Norwegians, or Nordic
stability as the Finns called it, and from Sweden’s impressively strong defense. During the period, Nordic
collaboration was thus more important for Finland
than for other Nordic countries. This gave Finland
an opportunity to profile herself in her natural reference group, the Nordic countries. Great efforts were
made, particularly in Finland and Norway, to reach
mutual understanding on defense, but this did not
always succeed.
The cornerstone of the Finnish defense concept
was, and still is, compulsory conscription. In the
1970s, this could generate a 700,000-strong wartime
force consisting mostly of trained reserves. The drawback, obvious to all informed observers at home and
abroad, was that adequate weaponry and equipment
sufficed only for a small fraction of the mobilized
army. Many would only have been provided with
worn-out wartime weapons. This choice was one of
necessity, since the Finnish national economy was
too small to provide for well-equipped armed forces
capable of defending the country alone against a superpower. Therefore, neutral Finnish foreign policy,
and good, friendly and mutually beneficial relations
with the Soviet Union became Finland’s main security
tool, and military policy was relegated to a minor role.
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Accordingly, defense capability was measured so as
to provide an initial threshold capability, high enough
to give an adversary serious pause for thought about
costs and risks.
The extent of Soviet pressure against Finland varied over the years, but very serious challenges by the
Russians were felt on more than one occasion. A crisis
situation arose on October 30, 1961, when the Soviet
Union made a formidable demonstration of power,
exploding the enormous “Tsar bomb” equivalent to
57 megatons of TNT over Novaya Zemlya. On the
same day, Finland received a diplomatic note from
the Soviet Union regarding a review of bilateral relations, which led to great concern in Finland and also
in its neighboring countries, and more generally in
the West. Russia’s timing was well judged; Kekkonen
was on a state visit to the United States. He was then
ordered to travel not to Moscow, but all the way to
Novosibirsk for talks with the Soviet leaders. It was
later assessed that Kekkonen had overreached in his
attempts to edge Finland slowly in the direction of the
West, and the Soviet leaders did not tolerate this.
Another serious incident occurred in 1978 during
an official visit to Finland, when Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Dmitry Ustinov suggested joint military
exercises between the Finnish and Soviet armies. Kekkonen’s approach was to ignore the proposal, and he
successfully avoided discussing the topic altogether.
However, the Finnish Chief of Defense, with skillful
diplomatic assistance, rejected the proposal politely,
but decisively.10
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Sweden.
Through good luck and good judgment, Sweden
had succeeded in staying out of World War II, and so
emerged from the war stronger than any of her Nordic neighbors. The imminent threat to Sweden from
Nazi Germany in 1940 was contained as a result of
British resistance. Later, the Allied Powers’ war effort against Germany largely removed the existential
threat against Sweden.11
After the war, however, all Scandinavian countries
had to decide their security direction. As relations
between the former Allies began to deteriorate and,
in Winston Churchill’s words, “an iron curtain descended across the Continent,”12 Sweden, in particular, began to explore the possibility of a Scandinavian
defense alliance of neutral countries between East
and West. Negotiations between Sweden, Norway,
and Denmark took place in 1948-49, but eventually
broke down as Norway and Denmark opted out. This
defense alliance was not felt to be robust enough to
counterbalance Soviet power, and, in addition, Oslo
and Copenhagen saw no particular value in neutrality.
Therefore, they instead joined those western countries
that founded the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) in 1949.13
Throughout the Cold War, defense planning in
Sweden, Norway, and Denmark was based on territorial defense and general conscription. In Sweden, defense spending was of the order of 3-4 percent of gross
domestic product (GDP), and the capability generated
in all three military branches to repel invasion well beyond Swedish borders was most impressive. At the end
of the Cold War in 1988, the Swedish wartime strength
was about 850,000, including a 100,000-strong Home
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Guard. The army consisted altogether of 29 brigades
or brigade equivalents, five of which were armored.
The air force had about 350 combat aircraft, equipped
with state-of-the-art air combat and anti-ship missiles,
in 24 interceptor, attack, and reconnaissance wings.
The navy’s battle order consisted of over 70 surface
combat ships, mine warfare vessels, and a dozen very
capable and silent submarines. In addition, there were
over 20 Swedish coastal artillery units with high firepower, most of which were placed in strongly fortified
permanent positions, in addition to four mobile units
equipped with high-precision anti-ship missiles.14
So-called armed neutrality became the trademark
of neutral Sweden. The military capability of Sweden
and its domestic military technology were respected
worldwide, and Sweden’s role in upholding Nordic
balance/stability was crucial. This also served Finland
well. In the beginning of the 1990s, Sweden’s neutrality was, however, revealed to be rather less than it had
been supposed to be during the Cold War. Thorough
later research by Dr. Robert Dalsjö15 and Mr. Mikael
Holmström,16 security policy reporter at the Swedish
daily Dagens Nyheter, has disclosed conclusively that
Sweden engaged in secret but elaborate military cooperation arrangements with her NATO neighbors
Norway and Denmark, and more importantly with
the United States and the United Kingdom (UK).
According to Dalsjö:
Sweden not only based parts of its Cold War security
policy on the expectation that the Western powers
would provide military assistance in case of a Soviet
attack. In addition, the [Swedish] cabinet had also secretly authorized the military authorities to undertake
preparations for this event, and a number of measures
had been taken.17
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This Swedish secret arrangement evolved during several decades parallel with the Soviet military
build-up, and was only known to extremely few government and military leaders. It is, however, not very
likely that the Russians were unaware of it. Only the
Swedish people knew nothing about it, which clearly
created operational difficulties. The major drawback
was that the arrangement could not be trained or
tested among the professional military, which raises
questions about its viability in a true armed conflict.
In addition, Dalsjö has tested Swedish neutrality in
five counterfactual gaming scenarios covering a broad
spectrum. In two cases, Sweden succeeded in staying
out of the war, but in the other three (Soviet policy of
extortion, an attack on Sweden alone, and a major conflict in Europe), Sweden was pulled into the conflict.
In the first case, the East was victorious, and the Soviet
side gained control of continental Europe, including
Norway and Denmark. The outlook for preserving
democracy and independence would have been grim
in the long term. In the second case, the West won,
and it was only in this case that Sweden’s stated goals
regarding its neutral policy would have been met.18
Norway and Denmark.
Peace in Europe in 1945 was the beginning of a
golden age for the Norwegian armed forces, based on
general conscription. After joining NATO in 1949, defense expenditure rose steadily and was 4.7 percent
of GDP (30 percent of the state budget) in 1952-53.
The peak of strength and resources came in the 1950s
and 1960s, with a 350,000-strong force being included
in contingency planning of the time.19 A quarter of a
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century later, mobilized wartime strength had been
reduced by about 100,000.20 General conscription remained in force, but only a few were chosen for duty.
This remains the case today.21
Throughout the Cold War, Denmark’s “total defense policy,” based on general conscription, generated 100,000 personnel for the armed forces upon
mobilization, backed by the 80,000-strong voluntary
Home Guard. Given Denmark’s strategic position as
the “cork in the Baltic Sea bottle” and the “bridge” between NATO’s central front and northern flank, allied
reinforcements were deemed critical.22
As NATO members, Denmark and Norway skillfully played their role in the Nordic balancing act
during the Cold War. Both countries refused to have
foreign troops stationed permanently on their soil or
nuclear weapons deployed. They also showed reluctance toward NATO exercises in the Baltic Sea and
close to the border of the Soviet Union. This policy of
nonprovocation toward the Soviet Union contributed
to stability in the area.23
For Denmark, the question of military protection
has altogether been a NATO matter. Denmark can be
described as an especially staunch ally of NATO and
the United States, in particular. Although Denmark
is a long-time member of the European Union (EU),
Denmark has not and does not participate in EU’s
military policy, which it deems counterproductive to
its own national interests.
The Danish view is rather critical of the Nordic
position, as displayed by Sweden and perhaps also
Finland, of being different from Europe and better
than Europe, and unique in offering a cooperative alternative to the Cold War policies of the superpowers
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and the old great powers in Europe. According to one
argument:
Nordic identity politics and Cold War value promotion in the [United Nations] was a ‘luxury good’, only
affordable because the Nordics were allowed a free
ride on a security order created by the presence of an
American security guarantee to Western Europe and
the institutionalization of the European continent.24

Hidden Cold War Cooperation with the
United States.
In order to understand the possible forms of military-related cooperation between Finland, Sweden,
and the United States during the Cold War, it is useful
to see how this played out between the Nordic countries themselves. As members of NATO, Norway and
Denmark were free to discuss any matter within that
framework. Discussions with non-NATO members
were more complicated. “Serious defense and security
policy discussions at the formal Nordic fora were . . .
officially taboo,” leading Finnish defense expert and
former government official Dr. Pauli Järvenpää wrote
in early-2014.
In reality, though, the situation was not so clear-cut.
The Nordic countries’ military intelligence organizations continued to talk to each other behind the
scenes, and the same Nordic officials and experts who
gathered to discuss UN peacekeeping issues could in
the margins privately discuss more hardcore defense
policy matters.25

Basic geopolitical and geographical facts and national policies largely defined the framework of mili14

tary cooperation between the United States and Sweden and Finland, respectively. Sweden was clearly in
a more favorable position than Finland, but the latter
had certain qualities, generated through Finland’s war
experience with the Soviet Union and the profound
need to understand Russian thinking thoroughly, that
were of interest to the United States and which the
United States wanted to exploit through state-to-state
cooperation, but also covertly. A more general U.S.
policy interest was to prevent Finland from falling
entirely into the Soviet orbit.
Sweden benefitted from the basic military fact that
Norway’s defense in depth was far too narrow and
had to be extended. U.S. and NATO contingency planning therefore largely covered Swedish territory, too.
Sweden thus took steps to facilitate receiving aid and
U.S. forces on her soil and also made some technical
preparations to be able to fight jointly. One particular example of such a step was secret links between
NATO air control systems in Norway and those of
the impressive Swedish air force. The flip of a switch
“instantly lit up the maps in the situation room considerably,” according to one insider.26 The drawback
was that strict Swedish neutrality determined what
was and was not possible. These arrangements were
secret and could not be used for joint training purposes. They were items in a toolbox to be used, but only
in war.
Intelligence cooperation between Sweden and the
West, and the United States in particular, is perhaps
one of the most important forms of long-time military
cooperation between the countries.27 The Swedish National Radio Establishment (FRA) is an acknowledged
and respected actor in the signal intelligence field and
has cooperated with the National Security Agency for
a very long time.28
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One particular feature of Swedish neutrality during the Cold War was to emphasize reliance on domestically built arms, such as fighter aircraft and army
and navy equipment. The results were impressive.
But Sweden increasingly had to rely on subsystems,
components, and spare parts from foreign sources,
most often American. Defense industrial cooperation between Sweden and the United States therefore
also has a long legacy. Sweden was among the first
countries to receive U.S. built heat-seeking and radar
guided air-to-air missiles, as well as licenses to produce these domestically.29 Sweden, which had a serious domestic nuclear weapons development program
in the 1950s and 1960s that the United States wanted
to end, skillfully negotiated benefits from the United
States as a compensation for abandoning the military
nuclear program, which eventually took place in 1968
as Sweden was among the first signatories of the NonProliferation Treaty. U.S. National Security Council
policy recommendations in 1960 specifically stated:
Provide no grant military assistance to Sweden. However, be prepared to sell to Sweden military materiel, and
to provide training to Sweden on a reimbursable basis.
With due regard to NATO requirements, and provided
that prior offer to NATO allies has been made, be prepared to sell to Sweden modern weapons systems from
NATO or U.S. production or to authorize licensing arrangements for manufacture in Sweden.30

Finland, by contrast, emerged from having twice
only barely avoided military defeat against an overwhelmingly strong adversary, which would have led
to complete loss of its sovereignty. Finland was wartorn and poor, with its economy in shambles. Politically, Finland’s freedom of action was curtailed, and,
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for that reason, it had to turn down such vitally important U.S. initiatives as Marshall Plan aid.
At the time, U.S. understanding of the Finnish
dilemma and balancing act was perhaps not deep
enough, as U.S. good intentions and acts of support
and good will were rejected for reasons that Washington could not always comprehend. From a Finnish
viewpoint, the American overtures were often counterproductive. Under these circumstances, FinnishU.S. defense cooperation during the Cold War was an
extremely sensitive issue.
It was, however, also very much in Finland’s interest to establish military communication links between
Finland and the United States. Not surprisingly, military intelligence was the preferred tool. As chief of
Finnish intelligence, Colonel Lauri Sutela made his
first visit to Langley in the early-1960s, disguised as a
Belgian scientist.31 The Americans were interested in
Finnish views and assessments concerning the Soviet
Union in particular. Procedures for exchange of military information were agreed upon, and this arrangement has been developed ever since.
During the first years of the Cold War, when U.S.
National Technical Means were in their infancy, the
United States recruited seasoned, highly decorated
Finnish war-time rangers to collect information and to
scout on Soviet territory, particularly in the Kola and
the Karelian Isthmus. This activity was also related to
the Scandinavian plans for a stay-behind network of
partisans, a countermeasure against possible Soviet
invasion.32
Perceptions of Finland as some kind of a semi-Soviet state were, however, deeply rooted. When Sutela
first visited the United States as Chief of Defense 13
years later in 1975, he was greeted at the reception by
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a U.S. general: “Now you finally got permission of the
Soviet Union to travel here, did you?”33 To put these
remarks in context, former chairman of the UK’s Joint
Intelligence Committee (JIC) Sir Paul Lever noticed on
a tour of Soviet secret police (KGB) headquarters in
Moscow that the photo gallery of foreigners that had
spied for the Soviet Union did not include any Finns
at all.34 Nevertheless, Sutela established good working
relations with the United States and communicated
directly with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The United States also benefitted from a number
of particularly distinguished Finnish military officers,
who left Finland for various reasons after the war and
ultimately settled in the United States. The two most
famous were Finland’s war-time Chief of Intelligence,
Colonel Aladár (a.k.a. Andrew) Paasonen and Army
Colonel Alpo K. Marttinen. Both were strongly urged
by Finnish Supreme Commander Marshal Carl Gustaf
Mannerheim himself to leave Finland in 1945, partly
for reasons of their personal safety but also in the
greater interest of Finland. After Mannerheim’s death
in January 1951 in Switzerland, Paasonen, who had
assisted Mannerheim in writing his memoirs, offered
a Central Intelligence Agency representative in Bern
his services. The Agency recruited him immediately.
Paasonen was, of course, a very valuable source, but
he was also useful in educating and training agents.
Later, he was transferred to Germany where he interrogated defectors from the East.35 He also played a role
in cooling down the U.S. organized scouting patrols
and reconnaissance flights into Soviet territory from
Finland, which had become so frequent and daring as
to cause the Finnish government concern.
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Marttinen had distinguished himself as a young
Captain in the Winter War, having planned a number of the spectacular operations where several Soviet
divisions were annihilated. During the massive Russian onslaught in the summer offensive in 1944, his
regiment was the first to stop the Russian advance
into Finland proper. Marttinen later made another
distinguished military career in the U.S. Army, rising
to the rank of colonel. Like his colleague and friend
Paasonen, Marttinen also offered U.S. intelligence
valuable services.
The U.S. Army recognized the particular skills
of the Finnish officers, especially in winter warfare,
and they were tasked to write new field manuals as
well as to train U.S. Soldiers in these skills. A series of
field manuals were published in 1951-52 (Field Manual
[FM] 31-70, Basic Arctic Manual; FM 31-71, Northern
Operations; FM 31-72, Administration in the Arctic; and
FM 31-73, Skiing and Snowshoeing).36 Marttinen died
in 1975 and is buried in the military cemetery in Ft.
Leavenworth, KS.
POST-COLD WAR DEVELOPMENTS
Finland.
Nobody could know for sure where the dramatic
geopolitical changes at the end of the 1980s were to
lead, but in Finland, developments were followed
carefully, and the Finns were prepared to take calculated risks to improve their political-security situation.
On September 21, 1990, Finland’s government unilaterally declared that the provisions of the Paris Peace
Treaty of 1947 limiting Finland’s sovereignty had lost
their meaning. At the same time, President Mauno
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Koivisto reinterpreted the FCMA Treaty, which finally disappeared into history on the fall of the Soviet
Union in December 1991.
Having loosened the political chains of the Cold
War, the next step of integration into Western political structures was an application for Finnish membership in the EU. Finland, Sweden, and Austria became
Union members on January 1, 1995. Finland has consistently striven to penetrate to the core of the EU.
There is active collaboration over a joint foreign and
security policy and a wish to strengthen the Union’s
crisis-management capability. Finland, however, decided not to aim for NATO membership, but rather
engaged in a very ambitious Partnership for Peace
program.
Finland adapted to the new European security order after the end of the Cold War and, while retaining
general conscription, adjusted the wartime strength of
the Finnish Defense Forces accordingly. While there
were no longer restrictions on Finnish peace-time
strength, which was about 30,000 and progressively
shrinking because of demographic reasons, the total
wartime strength had been reduced to 450,000 in 1997,
in 2008 to 350,000, and, after the conclusion of the present defense reform, it dropped to 230,000 in 2015.37 A
more detailed description of this process follows.
Sweden.
The basic structure and operational doctrine of the
Swedish defense forces—territorial defense against
invasion—survived well into the new millennium.
Spending levels, however, constantly exceeded what
was allocated in the budget, and manpower and capability levels could not be maintained. Business as usual

20

proved untenable in the long run. In 2009, the Swedish
Parliament adopted a bill on Defense Structure 2014,
a very radical departure from previous arrangements
toward a small professional army, primarily tailored
for crisis management operations and rapid reaction
defense capability, adapted to a defense spending
level of about half the 2.5 percent GDP level of 1988.
The former Swedish defense organization was rapidly dismantled as introduction of the new structure
met with profound difficulties. It is generally believed
that the new personnel structure will not be implemented until 2023 and that arms procurement will not
nearly meet the equipment needs originally stated.
The Swedish Parliamentary Defense Commission’s report in May 2014 does not dispel these misgivings.38 At
the time of this writing, the debate is in high gear, and
tough criticism from defense experts, often members
of the prestigious Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences, has been leveled at the Swedish Government’s
reluctance to adapt spending to the revised security
and threat assessment and the real needs perceived.39
Norway and Denmark.
Norway has undergone the same kind of defense
structure reforms as most other NATO countries. Mobilization defense has been abandoned in favor of a
rapid reaction capability defense, which shall provide
a war prevention threshold based on NATO membership.40 Peacetime strength in 2014 is about 23,000, and
83,000 after mobilization.41 According to Professor
Paal Sigurd Hilde:
Both traditionally and at present, Norway’s security
focus has to a significant degree been maritime in
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nature and directed towards the west and north. The
High North, equating in Norwegian usage roughly
the wider Barents Sea region, has since the early 1950s
been Norway’s primary security concern. It remains
so today, though obviously for somewhat different
reasons than during the Cold War.
. . . Throughout the Cold War, Norwegian priorities in
NATO included ensuring that the defense of Norway
was tied to that of Central Europe, that the US and
UK were represented on a high level in NATO commands in Norway, and that the US and other major
allies committed land forces to the reinforcement of
Norway in case of conflict.42

The key passages in the White Paper submitted to
the Norwegian Parliament concerning the main tasks
of the Norwegian Armed Forces read:
The intention of a war preventing threshold is to
achieve that a potential aggressor abstains from using military force against Norway. The Armed Forces
shall have a capability to react immediately, efficiently
and with relevant means if Norway is pressured, assaulted or attacked, and shall have capability to joint
action within the framework of the collective defense
of NATO. A capability to manage such military challenges shall contribute so that they don’t materialize.
NATO membership is the basis of the war preventing
threshold.43

In other words, as stated in a nutshell from former
Chief of Defense General Sverre Diesen, “Norway has
to ensure that there is no vacuum between what is too
big for Norway and too small for NATO.”
Prepositioning U.S. military equipment in Norway
has been a key component of U.S.-Norwegian bilateral military cooperation. The quantitative scale, of
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course, has diminished since the Cold War, but the
arrangement (Marine Corps Prepositioning Program
Norway) has nevertheless survived.44 In August 2014,
it was reported that the United States will preposition
Abrams M1A1 main battle tanks and other armored
vehicles in Norway.45 In addition, Norway is also
tasked with providing facilities for a NATO detachment and deployment of airborne early warning systems at the Air Force Base in Ørland. But Norway’s
continuing military vulnerability was acknowledged
in late September 2014, when Defense Minister Ine Eriksen Søreide announced that defense will have to be
radically upgraded, as a direct result of the increased
concern over Russia.46
After the end of the Cold War, Denmark, too,
adapted to the “new realities” and began restructuring the army from a force exclusively dedicated to
local defense to an army able to project the Danish
International Brigade and other rapid reaction forces
abroad in contingencies reaching from humanitarian
operations, peacekeeping, and peacemaking to outright combat operations in support of UN, NATO, and
the United States.
The present purpose and task of the armed forces
of Denmark is defined in a law that came into force on
March 1, 2001.47 This defines a number of purposes and
tasks. The primary purpose is to prevent conflicts and
war, preserve the sovereignty of Denmark, secure the
continuing existence and integrity of the independent
Kingdom of Denmark and further a peaceful development in the world with respect to human rights. Its
primary tasks are: NATO participation in accordance
with the strategy of the alliance; to detect and repel any
violation of sovereignty of Danish territory (including
Greenland and the Faroe Islands); defense coopera-
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tion with non-NATO members, especially Central and
East European countries; international missions in the
area of conflict prevention, crisis-control, humanitarian assistance, peacemaking, and peacekeeping; participation in total defense in cooperation with civilian
resources; and finally, maintenance of a sizable force
to execute these tasks at all times.
Denmark clearly stands out from the other Nordic
countries in this respect. Denmark has not refrained
from using force even in UN operations—as in the
case of a tank battle against Serbian armored units
in Bosnia.48 Denmark has participated as a U.S. ally
in Iraq and deployed a significant force in Afghanistan. An American former Special Operations Forces
(SOF) colonel commended the Danish input in the
counterinsurgency role in the difficult Helmand province in March 2009: “The Danes have the best trained
and equipped force in Afghanistan. They take the
hardest assignments, which they execute with outstanding professionalism and resilience. They never
complain.”49
Nordic Cooperation: Early Steps.
In June 2008, former Norwegian foreign and defense minister Thorvald Stoltenberg was asked by
Nordic foreign ministers to draw up proposals for
closer foreign and security policy cooperation between
the Nordic countries. At the same time, the Chiefs of
Defense of Norway, Finland, and Sweden submitted a
common report, the Nordic Supportive Defence Structures Report, to their respective governments and
presented the essential contents in an op-ed article
published in their three leading national newspapers,
Aftenposten, Helsingin Sanomat, and Svenska dagbladet.50
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The Chiefs had identified 140 areas of possible defense
cooperation, 40 of which could be carried out rather
rapidly. From the perspective of defense planning,
the Chiefs’ report was significant. Aftenposten later
reported that the U.S. ambassador to Norway had expressed concern over this development. In the view
of Ambassador Benson K. Whitney, the Nordic move
contained clear dangers to U.S. interests. Politically,
it was feared, Nordic cooperation could weaken the
traditionally strong defense ties between the United
States and Norway.51
Stoltenberg presented his report in February 2009.52
Its essence was a list of 13 specific proposals, starting
with setting up a Nordic Stabilization Task Force for
international peace-building purposes. Stoltenberg’s
proposal for air surveillance over Icelandic airspace
took a big step forward in February 2014, as aircraft
from NATO partners Finland and Sweden gathered in
Iceland for the Iceland Air Meet event, together with
the Norwegian Air Force, which had assumed the
NATO peacetime preparedness mission over Iceland.
Stoltenberg presented four specific proposals concerning maritime monitoring and arctic issues, which
were widely perceived to reflect specific Norwegian
interests. Only two proposals addressed direct military cooperation. They built on the earlier proposals
by the Finnish, Norwegian, and Swedish Chiefs of
Defense, and concerned cooperation on issues such as
transport and lift capability, medical services, education, materiel and exercise ranges. A separate proposal
was to establish a Nordic amphibious unit, built on already existing units and cooperation between Finland
and Sweden. Stoltenberg’s last proposal regarded a
declaration of solidarity:
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The Nordic governments should issue a mutual declaration of solidarity in which they commit themselves
to clarifying how they would respond if a Nordic
country were subject to external attack or undue
pressure.53

The language used by Stoltenberg can be interpreted as indicating the magnitude of the political difficulties entailed in discussion of binding security guarantees between the Nordic countries. For guarantees to
be at all realistic, each country should, as a starting
point, be capable of both giving and receiving military
aid. This is not currently the case, although work is in
progress, for non-NATO nations Finland and Sweden,
for whom legally binding host nation support agreements with NATO would be needed.54
The Danish and Norwegian views are that the
question would be resolved if Finland and Sweden
were to change political course and join NATO. At
present, NATO membership is still a domestic political minefield in both Finland and Sweden, with the
question of membership the subject of a political stalemate that has remained rock-solid over decades.55 But
the abrupt change in the political landscape of Europe
signaled by Russia’s invasion and annexation of parts
of Ukraine has triggered a real debate and the first significant shift in public opinion polls for some time.56
With a new sense of urgency over the issue of membership, it has been suggested that Finland’s upcoming elections in the spring of 2015 could in effect be a
referendum on joining NATO.57
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Nordic Defense Cooperation.
Meanwhile, however, the Nordic military communities have long understood that capabilities cooperation will be a key issue for their respective countries.
Austerity measures and the general decline of military
capability in European NATO and elsewhere, as well
as the U.S. “Asia pivot” policy, have exacerbated this
need still further. Great expectations have therefore
been attached to the rather less ambitious Nordic
Defense Cooperation structure (NORDEFCO).
Also in 2008, Nordic Ministry of Defense officials began to explore the possibilities of replacing
the existing multiple defense-related cooperation arrangements between their countries with one single
structure. The advantages and possible benefits were
recognized in all Nordic capitals, and NORDEFCO
was established in 2009, with a stated aim of:
The main aim and purpose of the Nordic Defense
Cooperation (NORDEFCO) is to strengthen the participating nations’ national defense, explore common
synergies and facilitate efficient common solutions.58

NORDEFCO is flexible in its format, and the participants can choose the projects in which they want to
take part. Decisions are taken by consensus, but without veto rights. This means that a country can opt out,
but not prevent other countries from going ahead if
they wish to do so. In practice, this means that much
of the cooperation is likely to be carried out bilaterally or trilaterally, but not to the detriment of other
members.59
NORDEFCO has an annually rotating chairmanship, and the Ministers of Defense and Defense Policy

27

Directors of member states meet twice a year. Practical work is coordinated by a Defense Policy Steering Committee, which, in turn, gives tasks to and receives military advice from the Military Coordination
Committee (MCC).
The military level of NORDEFCO is divided into
five Cooperation Areas (COPAs) subordinate to the
MCC, namely Capabilities, Human Resources and
Education, Training and Exercises, Operations, and
Armaments. The COPAs cover the whole defense
force spectrum, but with different time perspectives.
Finland assumed the chairmanship of NORDEFCO for the second time in 2013. Reflecting on
achievements during the year, the Political Steering
Committee stated:
Perhaps the most important achievement . . . was the
development of the NORDEFCO ‘vision 2020’; renewing the political commitment in deepening our cooperation and giving guidance to our armed forces in
areas such as maritime and air surveillance, exercise
cooperation and rapid deployment in the framework
of the EU and NATO. The vision will form the basis of
the political guidance of the Nordic defense cooperation as we move towards 2020.60

The activities and achievements for 2013 listed by
MCC Chairman Lieutenant General Mika Peltonen included a 4-year action plan for 2014-17, coordinated
on the military and political level. This plan includes a
clear ambition to test the future Nordic Battalion Task
Force 2020 during Exercise Cold Response in 2016.61
But despite advancing rapidly over the course of
5 years, NORDEFCO still has a long way to go from
information exchange toward effective cooperation.
Peltonen’s report for 2013 also highlighted that:
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Nordic defense cooperation has become more systematic and goal-oriented; day-to-day cooperation and
the exchange of information have increased considerably. Although top-down (Mil/Pol) long-term commitment is still needed to reach desirable effects,
progress is made in small steps in the right direction.
Nordic thinking in our nations has increased on the
military level from a chair-nation driven Annual Action Plan to a more Nordic Action Plan with a longer
horizon. Furthermore, NORDEFCO has been recognized as an attractive regional military cooperation
forum for cooperation, benchmarking and exchanging
information.62 [author’s emphasis]

For all its qualities, NORDEFCO is and will remain
only a military-political tool. NORDEFCO was formed
at a time when no traditional external threats were
felt in the Nordic countries and, except for Finland,
national territorial defense was no longer deemed
relevant. For nonaligned countries like Finland and
Sweden, NORDEFCO is not a game changer in the
same sense as joining NATO or forming a coalition
of the willing, committed to binding solidarity with
each other.
Joint Procurement.
Coordinated multinational military procurement
is a field that Nordic politicians like to see as a pragmatic way to increase efficiency and save costs. Unfortunately, practice does not reflect theory, and, all
too often, ambitious joint procurement projects have
misfired. Denmark, Sweden, and Norway could not
agree on Project Viking, an attempt to develop a common submarine. Finland and Sweden cooperated in
designing and producing the AMOS 120 millimeter
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twin-barreled mortar turret, which was then dropped
by Sweden and shelved as artillery in its reorganization.63 More recent failures include the SwedishNorwegian archer artillery system, and a major joint
Swedish-Norwegian purchase of military trucks is
in jeopardy.
The Nordic Standard Helicopter Project initiated
in the late-1990s is a prime example. After lengthy
deliberations, all four countries went their separate
ways: Denmark eventually settled for the Italian
Agusta EH-101, while Finland, Sweden, and Norway
chose different versions of the French-German NH-90.
Differing technical demands and preferences slowed
down deliveries to such a degree that the NH-90 project has not been fully concluded even now, some 15
years later.
This is, however, not an unusual outcome when
dealing with multinational European contractors. Defense company ownerships in Europe are complicated, and it is not always easy to ascertain that purchase
is based on fair competition. Synchronizing national
needs with more common multinational ambitions
has proved to be a tricky business. Furthermore,
equipment life-cycles in different countries may differ too much from each other for joint purchases to
make sense, and operational demands, including usage and deployment in differing environments, also
contribute to the difficulties.
Bilateral Finnish-Swedish Cooperation.
Finland and Sweden signed a bilateral action plan
for deepened peace-time defense cooperation in May
2014.64 When announcing the contents of plan, ministers Karin Enström (Sweden) and Carl Haglund (Fin-
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land) listed nine specific areas for bilateral cooperation. Among those were the following two concerning
the army:
1. Explore the possibilities to deepen bilateral cooperation in exercises, education, gender issues, and
training, for example in the area of artillery, basic military training, winter training, and mechanized units,
as well as in common use of training facilities.
2. Explore the possibilities to contribute combined
units to international exercises and operations, as well
as to force registers in the UN, the EU and NATO.
Furthermore, the plan stated:
The Defence Forces will deliver a preliminary joint
report on feasible cooperation areas by October 2014.
The Defence Forces will continuously make suggestions for concrete cooperation areas as their work progresses but no later than January 2015. The political
decisions concerning deepened bilateral cooperation
in specific areas both at the MoD and Defence Forces
level will be made continuously starting in February
2015.
The practical cooperation areas will be incorporated in
the regular planning process of the respective Defence
Forces beginning no later than in the spring of 2015.65

A NEW ERA OF VULNERABILITY?
In a report published in June 2014, researchers
from the Swedish National Defence Research Establishment (FOI) summarized the major consequences
for European security of Russia’s illegal annexation of
Crimea and aggression in eastern Ukraine as follows:
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Geopolitical struggle has returned with a vengeance
and will not go away . . . this presents a fundamental challenge to the permanent formation of a liberal,
rules-based security order in Europe. This has been at
the center of political efforts in Europe during at least
the last quarter-century. What has happened, as an immediate consequence of the crisis over Ukraine, is that
geopolitical struggle and traditional balance of power
issues have been brought out into the security policy
daylight again. This may influence the European security order in a long-term perspective. What is actually
most likely is that the current antagonism between,
on the one hand, Russia, and on the other, the United
States and most of Europe, generates several forms of
negative spirals.66

“Little did we know a year ago what kinds of challenges we would face during the coming year,” Swedish foreign minister Carl Bildt wrote in his blog at the
time.67 Later, Finnish foreign minister Alexander Stubb
echoed the sentiment, asking “Were we blind?” in a
major speech in Berlin.68 These astonishing admissions
were by no means unique since, with the exception of
a few Eastern European countries such as Poland and
the Baltic States, the dramatic events in Ukraine beginning in November 2013 came as a major strategic surprise for Western nations—a situation that a report by
the UK’s Parliamentary Defence Committee blamed
on the wasting away of analytical expertise covering
Russia.69 These surprises simply should not occur.
Ample warning had been given over many years, but
the major western governments in particular did not
pay attention.70 One especially noteworthy warning
was the open letter to the Barack Obama Administration published by 22 prominent Baltic and Eastern European leaders in July 2009. They noted that “Russia
is back as a revisionist power pursuing a 19th-century
agenda with 21st-century tactics and methods.”71
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Previously, Finnish minister of defense Jyri Häkämies had voiced the concern of the Finnish defense
community in a speech in Washington in September
2007 titled, “The three main security challenges for
Finland today are Russia, Russia, and Russia. And
not only for Finland, but for all of us.”72 Mr. Häkämies’ remarks, however prophetic, created a political
storm back home in Finland. Despite its well-deserved
reputation for knowing and understanding Russia,
Finland did not act as a whistleblower, but kept well
in line with other countries that read the signs on Russia wrongly or simply did not care. It should be noted
that defense researchers in Finland and Sweden contributed a consistently more sober view of the increasingly disturbing developments in Russia, but their
analysis was not fully appreciated by policymakers
and academics, who were inclined to be more optimistic. In some important decisionmaking circles, defense
researchers’ findings were found too disturbing to be
taken seriously and were therefore either treated with
silence or rejected outright.73
From a Nordic viewpoint in particular, it is alarming and highly regrettable that the European security
order, tediously built over a span of more than 4 decades, is in disarray. This includes the Helsinki Final
Act of 1975 and particularly its clause regarding the
sanctity of borders between states. In 1975, this agreement that borders could be changed only peacefully
in the future was an unexpected and remarkable diplomatic achievement—especially given its signing in
the capital of a nation whose position was still uncertain. This is the backdrop to the comment by Haglund
in June 2014: “Are we in Europe returning to a time
when state borders can be unilaterally displaced by
use of military force or threat thereof?”74 Conversely,
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the assurance by President Obama in Tallinn, Estonia,
in September 2014 that “borders cannot be redrawn
at the barrel of a gun” rather overlooks the repeated
demonstration by President Vladimir Putin that, yes,
they can.75
While major western powers are, for the time being, rejecting the notion of a new Cold War for the
simple reason that Russia is perceived to be too weak
to threaten their core interests, Russia nevertheless accuses the West of reintroducing Cold War mentality
and diplomacy, forcing Russia into a new Cold War
by refusing to adhere to the principle of indivisible
and equal security for all. The return of hardline antiwestern Russian policy is favorably received by the
majority of the Russian population, saturated with
disinformation about Western ill will toward Russia and how the Motherland is besieged by enemies.
Putin’s approval ratings are very high. These Russian sentiments are read loud and clear in small states
neighboring Russia. From this perspective, the new
Cold War is real enough.
Alarm at the Russian trajectory is reaching public opinion across the Nordic states,76 mirroring the
awakening of public consciousness in other countries
such as Latvia77 and Poland.78 But the role of Finland
as the border state that safeguards Nordic security as
a whole makes Finnish reactions especially vital. Finnish public opinion is, of course, divided. Some voices
try to reassure the Finnish people by simply claiming
that the country is safe because Finland is so different
from Ukraine. Others are not convinced. But, despite
the fact that Finns as a whole have been rudely awakened by events in Ukraine, the Finnish economy is
faltering, austerity measures have already hit Finnish
defense hard, and most politicians are not willing to
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spend significantly more on defense. President Sauli
Niinistö stated in June 2014 that Finland does not have
the resources to maintain a credible national defense.79
Few experts, if any, think that Finland will be able to
build its defense alone. It follows that deeper cooperation between the Nordic states is essential.
PRESENT POLITICAL TRENDS
AND PROSPECTS
In political terms, the situation in the Nordic countries remains deadlocked. Denmark, Norway, and Iceland are firmly in the NATO camp, while Finland and
Sweden remain nonaligned, but no longer neutral. A
distinct majority of the Finnish and Swedish peoples
still do not see NATO membership as the preferred
solution. This clearly complicates options for finding
a rational long-term regional defense solution for the
High North and the Baltic Sea area.
Given the nonalignment status of two Nordic
countries, it is perhaps somewhat surprising that only
Finland does not a priori assume that others will come
to its aid if it is attacked. Nevertheless, building on
historical experiences and international accords, the
Finnish political leadership does not expect to be left
entirely alone if sovereignty is threatened. Finland
often refers to the EU solidarity clause stated in the
Lisbon Treaty, which commits member states to help
each other by all available means.
Sweden behaves otherwise and works on the assumption that others will rush to her aid, as if the
unofficial security guarantee from the Cold War still
was valid and in place. But it is not. U.S. Ambassador
to Sweden Mark Brzezinski, in a 2014 briefing to the
Swedish parliamentary defense commission, declared
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clearly that there are no such security guarantees between Sweden and the United States or between Sweden and NATO. Brzezinski also voiced skepticism
over the commission’s conclusion that Sweden would
build security together with other countries. Without
NATO membership, he noted, there are no such security guarantees.80 Thus, the U.S. attitude regarding
Nordic defense cooperation appears to have remained
unchanged during the last 5 to 6 years. One may,
however, ask if this attitude is more a sign of militarydiplomatic inertia than the result of a thorough reassessment of the demands of the new situation in Europe. A relevant question is therefore to try to find out
if there is any way other than NATO membership to
generate a Nordic solution for the short- and mediumterm, which would improve the security position of
all western actors involving the region, including the
United States.
It is clear to European partners that U.S. patience
with some leading NATO member states has worn
thin over the last two administrations. Occasional lack
of solidarity, but especially the persistent unwillingness of some major NATO members to share burdens
with the United States, have had a negative impact.
Many NATO members, on the other hand, have been
reluctant to increase their defense budgets or assume
larger responsibilities. For friendly outside observers,
this raises serious concerns about the extent of mutual
loyalty within the Alliance. Political cohesion within
NATO also seems to be in doubt as a number of former
Warsaw Pact countries seem to be “bowing to Putin’s
power,” as a senior U.S. observer put in a Washington
Post editorial in mid-October 2014.81
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Norway and Denmark, however, are among
those members of NATO that stand out favorably
in terms of commitment. Both countries contributed
significantly to the combined effort in Afghanistan,
and former U.S. defense secretary Robert Gates commented favorably on both countries’ performance
in operations in Libya. Denmark’s assumed burden
and contributions have been particularly outstanding. At the same time, Finland and Sweden also deployed forces to Afghanistan and have contributed to
building stability there. Swedish air force combat aircraft also participated in a combat role with Alliance
members in Libya.
With this in mind, one could perhaps try to explore
the possibilities of a coalition of the willing between
the United States and the Nordic countries, based
on the fundamental principle that all Nordic countries need each other and the United States for their
security. As noted earlier, the United States needs to
have friends and allies in place in order to secure its
interests and the stability in the High North and the
Baltic Sea area. In a time of both increasing tension
and declining military strength and capabilities, the
need to cooperate constructively together ought to be
self-evident.
Four Nordic prime ministers and the president of
Finland met with President Obama in Stockholm in
September 2013. Previously, the three presidents of
the Baltic States had met with Obama in Washington
at the end of August 2013. On both occasions, observers reported that the U.S. side saw the regional
leaders as a team, rather than representatives of individual states.82 The meeting produced a joint declaration, and a new forum, The Nordic Security Dialogue,
was launched.83 It was agreed that this dialogue will
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be conducted on an annual basis. It has yet to be
seen whether it will be conducted on a high enough
political level to have real impact.
Yet as the deterrent and war-preventing value of
the Nordic defense forces—especially Finnish and
Swedish—is increasingly challenged, building common capabilities cannot wait, but should be pursued
vigorously despite national political obstacles. Bearing in mind the need to synchronize Nordic defense,
waiting for all Nordic countries to join NATO is not an
option. Unless some extremely dramatic turn for the
worse happens in the Nordic neighborhood, the wait
will probably be too long. In the meantime, national
defense capabilities in Finland and Sweden are likely
to deteriorate further to skeleton levels.
In theory, the political building blocks for cooperation should be largely in place. Norway’s and
Denmark’s commitment to transatlantic security is
rock solid, and Finland’s is unambiguous, as stated by
Haglund in a speech in Washington in January 2014:
I begin my remarks by highlighting the two key security partnerships that Finland has: (1) the strong bilateral relationship with the United States, and (2) the active partnership we have with the Atlantic Alliance.84

Haglund’s speech was approved by the Finnish
president and senior cabinet ministers. For a notionally non-aligned country, his statement on security partnerships is extraordinarily strong and clearly worded.
It also differs essentially from the wordings of earlier
Finnish administrations, where the UN, other international organizations, and soft power had a prominent
role. Surprisingly enough, despite the strong factions
of centrists and leftists with neutralist leanings in the
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Finnish parliament, this important clarification of the
Finnish government’s political-security position has
not yet been debated in Finland at all. Niinistö reiterated in August 2014 the need for Finland to explore
all possible security partnerships, their benefits, and
limits, including partnership with the United States.85
For outside observers, the Swedish position is baffling. The new organization of the Swedish defense
forces, tailored for crisis management and international operations, is severely underfunded and will
not be fully in place before 2023. But the old organization, built for territorial defense, has already been
dismantled altogether. Norway and Denmark are
better off, but their forces, too, are primarily designed
for crisis management and international operations.
Now that territorial defense has returned strongly to
the scene, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark all lack sufficient boots on the ground, not to mention reserves
to sustain prolonged regional military presence or
large-scale combat. Finland is the only Nordic country
that still can generate substantial amounts of trained
combat troops, but the downside is that the bulk of
the Finnish mobilization army sorely lacks modern
equipment. Only a small fraction of the planned 11
wartime brigade equivalents are adequately equipped
at present.
Figuring out what to do to make defense work on a
Nordic regional scale is tricky, but essential in order to
maintain stability in the region and avoid the frightening prospects which inaction would eventually trigger. One of the conclusions made by Danish defense
researchers in their analysis of the Ukraine crisis is
worth noting: Military power is the basis for peace in
Europe. “Credible deterrence is the key to secure that
the Putin regime does not escalate the conflict with the
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west to a point, where the west chooses to intervene
militarily.”86
FUTURE MILITARY-POLITICAL CHALLENGES
If asked how to organize Nordic defense, given the
material at hand, a senior soldier from outside the region with a good professional perspective and vision
could easily formulate a militarily sensible framework
solution. One such template was already provided
20 years ago, when General John J. Sheehan, Commander in Chief U.S. Atlantic Command and NATO’s
Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, presented his
view. Dwindling defense budgets “may force the militaries of separate nations to fight as one, with the army
coming from Finland, the air force from Sweden and
the Navy from Norway,” he wrote at the time.87
For Northern Europe, where the allied nations have
made substantial defense cuts since the end of the
Cold War, the concept [of Combined Joint Task Forces] holds promise. . . . It is entirely possible that [eventually] you will see a kind of regional approach in
the north that will have a CJTF [Combined Joint Task
Force] capability.88

Sheehan was of the opinion that the prospects for
this sort of arrangement were far better in the north
than in NATO’s southern areas. Sheehan presented
these radical ideas in Norway in spring 1995, but
did not find a receptive audience among the senior
Norwegian military brass.89 All the same, several of
Sheehan’s arguments may even be more valid today
than 2 decades ago. The diminution of defense budgets that he predicted, at a time when downsizing and
restructuring defense forces and cashing in the peace
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dividend was only about to begin, has continued unchecked throughout the period. The once formidable
Swedish air force no longer stands out as before, but
is more or less on par with the three other Nordic
air forces. But this is balanced by another significant
change: the rise of the Finnish air force to a truly
capable regional air force.
Geography, however, is a constant. In a conflict
in the Nordic region, Finland’s fate is to fight on the
ground, alone or with outside help. But as long as Finland lacks binding security guarantees, it is unwilling
to take on the responsibilities of others. Finnish State
Secretary for Defense Lieutenant General Arto Räty
said in mid-June 2014: “It cannot be, that we would
make commitments which relate to NATO’s Article
Five, i.e., common defense, without ourselves being a
NATO member.”90
SWEDISH AND FINNISH VULNERABILITIES
Within the long-standing Finnish and Swedish
defense exchange program, defense researchers were
free to explore more far reaching cooperation possibilities “outside the politically mandated box.” The first
small project started at the Finnish National Defence
University in 2010 and resulted in a working paper.91
The starting point was to identify weaknesses and
strengths of the radically different defense concepts of
Finland and Sweden and to discover what gains and
drawbacks pooling resources together could generate
from an operational standpoint. The peacetime readiness of the Finnish defense forces was found to be
insufficient and the mobilization process itself vulnerable, especially in the light of developments in Russia
toward radically increased surprise attack capabilities.
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Deployment of new dual-use precision strike systems
like the operational-tactical Iskander ballistic missile
and cruise missile systems well within striking distance of Finland was a particular cause for concern.92
Contributing to the Finnish problem is the recognition that a decision to mobilize the army is perhaps the
most difficult that the Finnish Supreme Commander
and the political leadership would ever have to take.
Serious gaming results indicate that timing the decision correctly is most difficult, and the risks are high
that it will be taken too late. Needless to say, the game
is over if mobilization fails. Successful Finnish mobilization would, however, be a key Nordic interest,
and therefore it was deemed necessary to explore how
Sweden and perhaps other Nordic countries could
give support.
The peacetime readiness of Sweden, however,
will be high after the defense reform is concluded. A
Swedish battle group could perhaps be available to
strengthen the Finnish peacetime readiness in a time
of crisis preceding mobilization. The main drawback
from the Finnish perspective is that Sweden’s own
critical needs in a crisis situation, such as the defense
of the capital Stockholm and critically important Gotland, and possible other solidarity commitments are
likely to rapidly exhaust her resources.
Lack of reserves is a very significant Swedish problem in a drawn-out crisis and that is likely to apply to
Norway, too. Finland is the only country in the region
that could, at least in theory, deploy trained reserves
in prolonged low-tension situations requiring some
military presence, for instance in the Arctic area. This
could involve mobilization of Finnish reserves on a
voluntary basis to assist Nordic neighbors and would
evidently require planning, multinational agreements
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and probably also domestic legislation. The Finnish
strategic reserve is perhaps her most valuable asset in
promoting deeper Nordic cooperation aiming at joint
performance. Nevertheless, such arrangements have
not been discussed yet, even informally.
SITUATION ASSESSMENT AND
PRACTICAL PROPOSALS
Historical experiences and an 800-mile long common border with Russia evidently influence Finnish decisionmaking and armed forces profoundly. A
thorough knowledge and understanding of Russian
military thinking and capabilities are prerequisites for
making correct decisions. Continuously updated and
detailed classified assessments are naturally among
the core tasks of the Finnish defense forces. But some
of these assessments are also available in the unclassified domain. A major effort to produce an unclassified
report on Russian military developments based on
open sources was initiated in 2010 at the Department
of Strategic and Defence Studies (DSDS) of the Finnish National Defence University. An interim report in
Finnish was published in September 2011, and an updated and expanded report in English in April 2013.93
Similar but broader assessments, entitled Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective, are regularly
published by the FOI.94 Most recently, Russian operations in Crimea and Ukraine have given rise to a substantial new wave of analysis assessing to what extent
the military performance seen in major Russian exercises translates into actual warfighting capability.95
One of the main conclusions in the DSDS report
concerning the developing Russian military capability was that capabilities are tailored to meet different demands against various opponents in different
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theaters. Swift surprise operations with elite forces
from their normal peacetime readiness may work well
against unprepared opponents with neglected defense
capabilities, but Russia also wants to maintain the capability to mobilize large conventional forces operating in more traditional manners. This is especially relevant when considering the potential for main force
operations, and countering the currently fashionable
assumption that all future Russian military ventures
will resemble actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine,
where the main force has not (to date) been relevant
other than as a distraction.
The Russian military’s performance has improved
significantly since the short war in Georgia in 2008.
The unexpected and rapidly executed annexation of
Crimea is proof enough. This was followed by the
slightly more covert attempt to secure parts of eastern
Ukraine, with the apparent aim to destabilize Ukraine
entirely. Western defense communities are now attempting to understand the implications of Russia’s
unorthodox asymmetric way of warfare, in this case
using SOF personnel, “volunteers” as well as ethnic
Russian separatists, on a more general scale. It is, however, most important not to dismiss the impressive
and greatly expanded Russian training and exercise
program for conventional forces. A recent example is
Russia’s counterexercise in the Kaliningrad area June
9-20, 2014, as a response to NATO’s BALTOPS ’14
and Saber Strike ’14 exercises in the Baltic Sea area.
The Russian exercise in Kaliningrad Oblast included
joint operations involving all three main services,
with a total strength on par with the corresponding
NATO exercises.
When the Kaliningrad exercise was over, yet another week-long snap combat readiness inspection ex-
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ercise immediately commenced in the Central Military
District, involving 65,000 troops, 5,500 military vehicles, 180 aircraft, and 60 helicopters.96 Subsequently,
the Vostok 2014 (East 2014) major strategic command
and staff exercise took place in the Eastern Military
District in September 2014. It was preceded by another unannounced snap inspection and involved about
100,000 servicemen transported by airlift or rail from
various regions, impressive amounts of equipment,
and units from different arms of service.97 In October
2014, a comprehensive civilian defense exercise was
held, involving 300,000 people. Interestingly enough,
the Russian air force also participated, as well as the
Strategic Rocket Forces, indicating a possible nuclear
dimension of this large exercise.98 The absence of any
similar exercise patterns of this scale in the west—despite Moscow’s claims of NATO and U.S. provocative
exercises near Russian borders—gives the Russians
great advantages in preparation for waging largescale war.
The Russian exercises have developed in quality
as well as quantity, according to assessments by respected military observers and analysts including in
Sweden.99 The Russian armed forces are now able to
perform increasingly complex joint operations, and
all three services appear to have done well. Remarkable improvements have also been achieved in command and control, and the beginning of widespread
use of a digital operational-tactical command system
has made it possible to conduct operations in a significantly higher tempo. The internal features of the command system, including data and intelligence fusion,
contribute to easier and more reliable decisionmaking.
A careful western response is warranted. As the
Afghanistan operation winds down, there is reason
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to contemplate what is prudent to do. Back to basics
is a good starting point. There is a renewed need to
develop tactics and operational art suitable for largescale combat against militarily well organized and
equipped opponents. Winter warfare is a specific area
where the Nordic states more generally could contribute. Finland, in particular, can contribute not only
substantial Arctic warfare experience, but also significant training facilities, as detailed further in the policy
recommendations on the succeeding pages.
September and October 2014 saw a range of initiatives and developments as each Nordic state responded in its own way to the new perceived challenge from
Russia. Sweden’s new fragile minority government
under Prime Minister Stefan Löfven stated clearly that
Sweden does not intend to apply for NATO membership during this government’s term.100 At the same
time, both Löfven and his Minister of Defence Peter
Hultqvist further stressed the commitment to Nordic
defense cooperation, particularly with Finland. According to Hultqvist, “deepening of defense cooperation between Sweden and Finland is one of the most
important projects during the next few years.”101 There
has even been discussion of the partial reinstatement
of conscription in Sweden. But mention of defense cooperation, or even alignment, with the United States is
conspicuous by its absence.
Finland, meanwhile, has announced specific measures to enhance readiness in response to updated assessments of the threat from Russia and the entirely
new security environment in Europe. Finnish Chief
of Defence General Jarmo Lindberg has laid out plans
for a Finnish “spearhead force” mirroring NATO’s enhanced reaction force, with particular reference to the
need to match the newly-demonstrated speed of Rus-
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sian decisionmaking.102 Elsewhere, Lindberg made
an explicit statement of the challenge that front-line
states now face:
Crisis situations have changed and become more diffuse, without a clear beginning or a clear finish. War
is not advertised as such, it begins and ends in its own
time. Typical of this period is that the boundaries of
peace, crisis and war come together to form a sort of
grey area of instability. The line between traditional
and unconventional warfare have been wiped out - or
rather, they are mixed in a new way with each other by
adding new elements of warfare employed. Contemporary warfare, now also known as hybrid warfare,
is exactly what this is all about, as events in eastern
Ukraine show us.103

Finally, in Norway, radical steps have been called
for to re-adapt the armed forces back to a defensive
capability. As noted earlier, Norwegian defense had
over decades changed from a mobilization force of
several hundred thousand soldiers, who would be
able to repel a full-scale invasion, to a different type of
defense effort where small but highly qualified units
would deploy in international missions or meet limited attacks on Norway. The result, according to one
analysis, is that:
The Army today is so small that it is pointless. The
manpower strength is hopelessly small, and there
are major shortcomings in core assets such as air defense, artillery and combat vehicles. . . . The Navy
is struggling with manning problems, to fill vessels
with people, and similarly the Air Force has difficulty
obtaining enough technicians for maintenance.104
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Similar analyses highlighted Norway’s reliance on
adequate warning of threats in order to prepare and
retrain to meet them, contrasted with Russia’s demonstrated new ability to move large forces rapidly
and—importantly—with little visible sign of preparation. In early October 2014, Norwegian Minister of
Defense Ine Eriksen Søreide publicly tasked Chief of
Defense Admiral Haakon Bruun-Hanssen to provide
a military assessment and advice on how to address
these new challenges.105
FUTURE WAR FOR THE NORDIC STATES
Former Norwegian Chief of Defense General
Sverre Diesen has presented interesting ideas for further cooperation with the aim of developing functioning defense forces for the future.106 Diesen notes that
the concept of maneuver warfare is still prevailing in
most western countries. The aim is to defeat the will
and belief of the opponent in his own operation and
to seize from him the initiative and capacity to influence the situation. The method to accomplish this is
to have faster decisionmaking in the command chain
and a higher operational tempo than the opponent.
Fully mechanized ground troops with full air support
have been the preferred tool.
The first two points are still valid, Diesen says. But
tank warfare along the basic principles that the Germans developed 80 years ago will have to yield. The
core of future ground forces will consist of small units,
which rely on technology and mobility—Intelligence,
Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
(ISTAR) units—that engage enemy troop concentrations, military convoys, command posts, and air defense systems. Diesen mentions small ISTAR patrols
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with light vehicles or other platforms, but adequately
equipped to spot and designate targets and transmit
target data to decisionmakers or directly to shooters.
Target data can then be distributed for engagement
to the most suitable platforms of the services at hand,
such as multirole air force platforms or sea-based platforms delivering long-range precision weapons.
In sum, the core of the new system consists of
distributed sensors and centralized weapons delivery systems. The maneuvering takes place with these
numerous light units, while engagement takes place
with stand-off weapons over long distances. Effect on
target can be achieved in a small fraction of the time it
would take to move mechanized units over such distances. ISTAR patrols need no armored protection, but
rather mobility, low signature and ability to disperse.
In addition to personal weapons, they also need manportable air defense systems to handle threats from
enemy aircraft and helicopters.
This new concept offers many advantages for
countries with small populations but large territories.
The number of fighting units remaining in the Nordic countries is so low that it has become impossible
to cover all of the territories with traditional forces,
or to respond to border infringements within reasonable time frames. The paradigm shift before us is that
technology will replace the need to transport heavy
units. Fire control tasks will be performed by light
and relatively cheaper small units that can be deployed to many critical defensive positions, while a
limited number of heavy weapon platforms cover the
territory as a whole.
Diesen underlines that it is imperative to understand the potential of information technology and
comprehend its impact on organizational and concep-
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tual matters. He suggests that Nordic nations should
during the coming years explore the possibilities,
conduct theoretical studies, move on to gaming and
simulations and practical trials, and in the end train
and exercise with full-scale troop units to test the concept. We understand Diesen’s thinking as related specifically to defense against classical invasion, and his
ideas are thought provoking and certainly need to be
explored. It should be mentioned, however, that his
ideas are not entirely novel. The Finnish doctrine of
regional defense and regional combat developed in
the 1960s included such elements. Unfortunately, they
were forgotten in the 1990s, only to return in the recently adopted new Finnish army doctrine.107
At the same time, it is evident that more is needed,
and it is questionable if this format alone addresses
other types of military threats, such as subversion and
sabotage activities aimed at paralyzing society even
before large scale attacks have begun—along the lines
of the Russian asymmetric warfare ideas currently
being applied in eastern Ukraine. Vital infrastructure
has to be protected and back-up systems built, e.g.,
for electricity and water supply, in order to increase
societal resilience. Local troops, reminiscent of home
guard units in the other Nordic countries, play a crucial role. The classical way to defeat SOF detachments
holding strategically important positions is firepower.
Local forces supported by main battle tanks are still a
useful tool even in urban combat.
Another serious question related to Diesen’s thinking is how small countries can afford sufficient quantities of stand-off precision weapons if the opponent
reverts to his traditional method of fighting, where
quantity is a quality of its own. The new Finnish army
fighting doctrine can be considered a step in the di-
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rection Diesen proposes. The aim is to cause the opponent maximum losses, stop him in his tracks, but
holding ground is no longer a key priority. There is,
however, an important exception. The Finnish capital
in Helsinki and other vital locations are to be defended at all cost, in order to secure political and military
leadership and decisionmaking. Although this Finnish approach may in some respects be considered
“old-fashioned,” with Finland’s inevitable role as the
“front line” of any future Nordic clash with Russia, it
will form an essential element of defense of the region
as a whole in precisely the same manner as it did in
1939 and 1944.
CONCLUSION
The present prolonged security crisis in Europe,
signaled by the war in Georgia in 2008 and then underlined by the armed intervention and land grab in
Ukraine, has fatally undermined the European security regime and exposed the vulnerabilities of Russia’s neighbors for all to see.108 The primary lesson
to be drawn from the crisis is that cooperation and
solidarity in resisting Russia is essential. Researchers from Denmark’s Center for Military Studies have
provided a sober assessment of why Russia continues to keep the initiative: It has not been a western
priority to formulate a coherent common policy to
control the situation.109 Because of different national
preferences, Russia’s actions have not been met with
a resolute response. Paradoxically, countries like
France and Germany have had no problems selling high-tech weapon systems to Russia at the same
time as they contemplate how to support Kyiv and
sanction Russia.
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The west has itself created space and freedom of
action for Russia. The way out, according to the Danish view, is to close ranks as to thwart Russia’s divide
and rule policy. It should be recognized that Europe
can have influence in security policy only by cooperating closely with the United States. Different European
positions will have to be reconciled. Consensus has to
be built, e.g., in the form of a new Strategic Concept
for NATO. Given the disparate views within Europe
and NATO, this is indeed a tall order to achieve.
With Europe divided and reluctant to share burdens, a Nordic regional coalition of the willing, supported by the United States, would be easier to achieve.
These countries share both interests and values. Norway is a good example of a NATO member that, despite being a neighbor to Russia, has nevertheless succeeded in maintaining good and relaxed relations to
Russia. A Nordic coalition within or outside NATO
would be no military threat to Russia, but would severely curtail Russia’s possibilities to threaten, coerce,
and extort.
Defense cooperation can be discussed by all sides,
including the United States, within the Nordic Security
Dialogue. This would contribute to the security and
stability of Europe’s North, while remaining a much
less politically sensitive approach than attempting the
same dialogue within the context of potential NATO
membership for Finland and Sweden. Nevertheless,
Finland’s present position as a nonaligned country
is untenable in the long run. As the doyen of Finnish
diplomats, Ambassador Jaakko Iloniemi has observed
that at present Finland carries the same risks as NATO
member states, but without credible assurances of
help or the benefit of NATO security guarantees.110
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Sweden is in many respects a question mark. On
the one hand, Swedish political culture relies heavily
on old traditions regardless of which political coalition is in power. This means continuity, predictability, and reluctance to deviate from past behavior. As a
result, the gap between the views and assessments of
leading politicians and those of the Swedish military
community about defense needs is increasing, to the
extent that they often seem to live in different worlds.
Swedish former senior defense official and researcher Krister Andrén asks if maintaining a warpreventing threshold capability has become forgotten
as a core task of the Swedish defense forces. His logical argument is that the Swedish threshold ambition
needs to be sufficiently high, so that there is no gap
between threats that are too big for Sweden alone and
too small for the Nordic countries as a whole. The
Nordic collective threshold capability, in turn, needs
to be sufficient that there is no gap between threats
that are too big for the Nordic countries combined and
too small for the surrounding transatlantic world, i.e.,
NATO and especially its most important member, the
United States.111
Nevertheless, the downward trend of Swedish military capability is not likely to change any time soon,
and at times Swedish defense policy appears to serve
only Swedish defense industrial policy, which limits
the potential for cooperation with other Nordic states.
For Sweden’s neighbors, this is far from reassuring. If
policy issues are complicated and difficult to tackle,
assessing military capabilities is easier. The results are
well known, although not always recognized. Overall, more than one of the defense forces under scrutiny
is in a lamentable condition. Any offensively minded
great power needs to consider the credibility of its
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neighbor’s defenses within its own offensive planning. Mathematical methods to evaluate such risks are
employed in contingency planning, and one Western
starting point is that the probability of success must
be greater than roughly 80 percent in order to contemplate even using military means to achieve a desired
political goal.112 The Russian army uses its own methods to assess these risks, but, given the harsh austerity measures that have hollowed out the Finnish and
Swedish defense forces, it goes without saying that,
from a Russian viewpoint, the operational risks of offensive action have diminished sharply.
Leading strategic thinker Professor Thomas C.
Schelling gave the following explanation in the 1960s
of why credible defense is so profoundly important:
The power to hurt can be counted among the most impressive attributes of military force. . . . The power to
hurt is bargaining power. To exploit it is diplomacy—
vicious diplomacy, but diplomacy. . . . it is not the pain
and damage itself, but its influence on somebody’s behavior
that matters.113

At present, maintaining the credibility of the defense of the Nordic states depends heavily on finding
a way to enhance defense cooperation both within the
region, and by extension with the United States.
IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS
Drawing from historical experiences and current trends, a short list of baseline assessments and
recommendations for U.S. policymakers can readily
be made:
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•	
The Nordic countries all need support from
the United States for their security, and the
United States needs reliable allies and partners
if it wishes to secure peace and stability in the
Nordic and Baltic Sea area, including the Arctic, where competition for natural resources is
bound to increase in coming decades.
•	
Russia’s actions have re-established military
power as the basis for peace in Europe. It follows that a credible defense posture is essential. But the lack of Nordic military resources to
fulfill nationally stated defense tasks in a time
of increased uncertainty is commonly acknowledged. As no Nordic country can manage
alone, cooperation offers the only sustainable
solution. The alternative—inaction—is entirely
unsatisfactory for any country in the region.
Norway and Denmark would not be reassured,
thanks to continued downsizing (including the
U.S. rebalancing to Asia) and the alarming potential for a split in NATO. Sweden has already
explicitly rejected territorial defense as a policy
for the foreseeable future, and Finland, despite
recent increased willingness to publicly state
the threat, remains exposed and unable to manage alone.
•	The time-consuming task of creating common
military capabilities should be pursued vigorously within the region in parallel with political efforts to align goals and objectives and improve cooperation. Informed encouragement
from the United States, with clear communication of the extent and limits of U.S. support, can
help foster this aim.
•	The “NORDEFCO” and “Joint Procurement”
sections highlight areas where the national pol55

icies and interests of individual Nordic states
have so far limited the effectiveness of cooperation programs. Nevertheless, any enhancement
of defense cooperation in any area complicates
the operational calculations of the potential
adversary. It follows that all opportunities to
work together should be pursued at the earliest stage possible given political constraints.
This applies in particular to building common
ground among leadership figures, including
sharing of situational awareness, assessments
and interpretations, the consequences of action,
and especially the consequences of inaction.
•	The long-term goal for the Nordic countries
must be the ability to fight as one entity in cooperation with the United States and NATO.
Meanwhile, a way should be found to allow
a politically acceptable coalition of the willing between the United States and the Nordic
countries to underwrite regional security.
•	But antagonizing Russia by singling out NATO
membership and endorsing it to Finland and
Sweden as the only possible path to achieve
Nordic security guarantees is at present bad
policy, given the political sensitivity of NATO
accession. More subtle policies, which could
use the Nordic Security Dialogue with the United
States as a forum for discussion and planning,
can work toward the same future goal without
precluding NATO membership in the future.
The long Norwegian experience of dealing with
Russia in a relaxed and nonadversarial manner
is a valuable asset in this respect.
•	Similarly, extensive analytical expertise on Russia throughout the Nordic states can be lever-
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aged to enhance U.S. understanding of Russian
intentions and capabilities. As noted by a UK
parliamentary committee in July 2014, Russia’s
neighbors have a powerful incentive to properly resource study and analysis in this area,
and these resources can be tapped into by the
U.S. Department of State and Department of
Defense (DoD) among others, given an appropriate framework for enhanced cooperation.114
•	There is an acknowledged need for armed forces within NATO and partner nations to change
focus from insurgency-related operations back
to more classic forms of state-on-state warfare.
Land warfare tactics and operational art against
modern but more traditional large-scale troop
formations need to be developed and trained in
Nordic environments and on sufficiently large
manpower scales. Winter and Arctic warfare
are fields where Finland and the Nordic states
more generally can contribute significant expertise and training resources for the benefit
of U.S. and allied forces. In particular, Finland
would be able to complement and cooperate
with NATO’s Cold Weather Operations (CWO)
Center of Excellence (COE) in Bodø, Norway.
The ranges at Sodankylä in northern Finland
have ample facilities for training and exercising defensive warfare together in at least battalion size formations, including support from
air assets, with the Rovajärvi live-firing range
and others nearby. This is a significant asset as
similar ranges are in short supply elsewhere,
especially in Western Europe. Finnish senior
officers unofficially advocate an additional
COE based on the Sodankylä assets, and focus-
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ing on Arctic land warfare in close coordination
with CWO COE.
•	It is important to bear in mind that the Norwegian-Russian border, although geographically
short, is strategically of profound importance
for Russia; the vastly longer Finnish-Russian
border does not carry the same relative strategic weight. This adds to the importance of the
Arctic as an area of strategic focus.
•	Finland is the only country in the region that
could, at least in theory, mobilize and deploy
trained reserves for prolonged low-tension
situations. The U.S. Army should consider options for cooperation with the Finnish military
for situations of this kind, requiring a military
presence to maintain security in the Arctic and
potentially other regions.
•	Enhanced cooperation with both Finland and
Sweden would self-evidently play a major role
in security assurance for the Baltic States, drastically reducing their current isolation in the
face of Russian intimidation. Both states are notably less resistant to defense burden sharing
than many established NATO allies in Western
Europe.
•	U.S. policymakers should be alert to shifts in
the domestic debates on NATO membership
in Sweden and Finland. In the case of Finland
in particular, already close integration with
NATO structures and compliance with membership criteria would facilitate a potentially
rapid accession process. This would imply a
sharp increase in potential for military and security cooperation with the United States, and
preparation for this eventuality by the U.S.
Army and DoD would be prudent.
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